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Regulatory choices in global financial markets – 
restoring the role of aggregate utility in the shaping of 
market supervision 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 1/2008 
Peik Granlund 




In financial market studies, public supervision has rarely been found to have any 
effects on financial market development. This is true, even though the primary 
objective of supervisory legislation is the limitation of market failures and 
externalities. Studies conducted by eg the World Bank and La Porta & al imply 
that whereas private enforcement contributes to financial market development, 
there is limited evidence that public supervision does the same. 
  The objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the relation between 
public supervision and financial market development. This is done by focusing on 
major legislative features directing the supervisor and hence affecting market 
participant activities. The markets investigated comprise banks, investment firms, 
investment fund companies and listed companies in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia for the years 1996 to 2005. 
  The results suggest that certain features of public supervision correlate with 
financial market development. Strong legal obligations for the supervisor to 
develop legislation correlate significantly with higher company market values. 
Emphasizing economic aspects in the formulation of supervisory objectives 
corresponds with higher market profitability. Furthermore, severe monetary 
sanctions applicable to company directors correlate negatively with market 
growth. Unexpectedly, the same is true for a high degree of supervisory 
independence. 
  The results imply links between public supervision and financial market 
development in a manner not always in line with previous research. Why this is 
the case, requires further investigation. One possible explanation may be 
methodological, based on the fact that in the present study legislative features are 
perceived in a conceptual rather than a technical manner. 
 
Keywords: financial institution, regulation, supervision, utility 
 
JEL classification numbers: G28, K23, O16  
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Sääntelyn ominaispiirteitä globaaleilla 
rahoitusmarkkinoilla – kokonaishyödyn merkityksen 
kasvattamisesta valvonnassa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 1/2008 
Peik Granlund 




Rahoitusmarkkinatutkimuksissa julkisella valvonnalla on harvoin todettu olevan 
vaikutuksia rahoitusmarkkinoiden kehitykseen, vaikka valvontalainsäädännön 
ensisijainen tavoite on markkinahäiriöiden ja nk. externaliteettien rajoittaminen. 
Monista tutkimuksista (esim. Maailmanpankki ja La Porta et al.) ilmenee, että 
siinä missä rahoitusmarkkinasektorin oma sääntely (private enforcement) edistää 
markkinoiden kehitystä, julkisen valvonnan myönteisistä vaikutuksista ei ole 
olemassa näyttöä. 
  Tässä selvityksessä oli tavoitteena tutkia julkisen valvonnan ja rahoitus-
markkinoiden kehityksen välistä suhdetta keskittymällä merkittäviin, valvojaa ja 
valvottavia ohjaaviin sääntelyn ominaispiirteisiin. Tutkimus kattaa pankkien, si-
joituspalveluyritysten, rahastoyhtiöiden sekä listattujen yhtiöiden markkinat 
Yhdysvalloissa, Isossa-Britanniassa, Ruotsissa, Suomessa, Puolassa ja Virossa 
vuosina 1996–2005. 
  Tulokset osoittavat, että tietyt julkisen valvonnan ominaispiirteet korreloivat 
merkitsevästi rahoitusmarkkinoiden kehityksen kanssa. Vahvat valvojalle asetetut 
velvoitteet kehittää sääntelyä korreloivat valvottavien korkeampien arvostustaso-
jen kanssa. Taloudellisten arvojen painottaminen valvojan tavoitteita määriteltäes-
sä korreloi valvottavien paremman tuottavuuden kanssa. Lisäksi ankarat valvotta-
vien johtoon sovellettavat rahalliset sanktiot korreloivat negatiivisesti markkinoi-
den kasvun kanssa. Yllättäen sama koskee myös valvojan itsenäisyyden astetta. 
  Tutkimuksen tulokset viittaavat julkisen valvonnan ja rahoitusmarkkinoiden 
kehityksen välisten suhteiden olemassaoloon aikaisemmista tuloksista poiketen. 
Yksi mahdollinen selitys tulosten poikkeavuuteen voi olla metodologinen ja 
perustua siihen, että tässä tutkimuksessa sääntelyä tarkastellaan kokonaisvaltaises-
ti, ei teknisesti. 
 
Avainsanat: rahoituslaitos, sääntely, valvonta, hyöty 
 








2  Previous empirical studies...............................................................................9 
 
3  Quantifying public supervision.....................................................................13 
 

















In 1873, Bagehot wrote: ‘the distinctive feature of the banker, begins as long as he 
uses the money of others; as long as he uses his own money… he is only a 
capitalist’.
1 From a theoretical perspective, a statement like Bagehot’s may be 
considered to appeal to the public interest theory motivating regulation of 
markets. The statement reflects the core of financial intermediation and its 
perceived relation to the rest of society, emphasizing the concept of assets, 
ministering and societal concern in a manner still valid. 
  Generally, public interference in market conditions is justified by its impact in 
terms of elimination of market failures and externalities. As is well known, such 
negatively documented outcomes of unregulated market conditions, are seen as 
obstacles to the enhancement of societal utility (orig. Pigou, 1938). The failures 
and externalities may affect the parties entering into market contracts but may 
likewise generate utility reductions for third parties through their implications on 
the flow of information or the availability and transferability of resources. 
Perceiving public interference from an economic theory perspective raises three 
specific types of issues in financial market research, ie issues relating to the 
questions whether to regulate, how to regulate, and how to evaluate the rules 
introduced.
2 
  Issues relating to the need and type of public interference have hitherto 
formed the focus of research. Economic growth as well as financial theory derived 
stability concerns, have directed economists’ discussions on whether and how to 
regulate. Also, in many studies, additional economic theory elements such as 
selfinterest and capturing have been touched upon. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
discuss the necessity of government intervention as a precondition for financial 
development, at the same time schematising actual public interference as the 
outcome of a battle of diverging interests. More often, studies are comparative, 
contrasting private with public enforcement vis-a-vis financial market 
development or stability in an empirical, normative or even predictive manner 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004).
3 
  Still, when it comes to empirical ex post assessment of public interference, a 
certain obscurity seems identifiable in today’s research. To begin with, legislative 
evaluation analyses are not frequent, though the number of such studies has 
increased rapidly from 2000 onwards. Second, economist and lawyer engagement 
                                                 
1 Bagehot, W (1873) ‘Lombard Street. A Description of the Money Market’. 
2 The tri-partite view on regulation in financial market research is easily identified in the 
introduction of La Porta et al (2006), whereas a corresponding general public economy perspective 
on regulation may be found in Polinsky and Shavell (2000) (the area of criminal law). 
3 Considering how public interference in financial markets could/should be brought about, studies 
conducted also deal with the distinction between the various branches of government, ie 
enforcement by the executive vs judiciary (Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer, 2001).  
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in the specific methodological issues posed by legislation evaluation has been 
fairly limited. And finally, many studies seem to indicate that the law does not 
matter, or at least does not promote financial market development.
4 
  The aim of this paper is to analyse the relation between public supervision and 
financial market development further by focusing on a number of major 
legislative features governing the supervisor’s activities. In the study, aspects of 
the supervisor’s mandate, qualities of the enforcement arsenal, the level of 
supervisory independence, as well as the degree of regulatory powers, are related 
to market conditions. Financial market development in turn is perceived as the 
level of market growth, profitability (RoE), market values (P/E) and risk 
(beta/volatility). Markets investigated using panel data, comprise banks, 
investment firms, investment fund companies and listed companies in the US, 
UK, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia. The analysed period covers the years 
1996 to 2005.
5 
  Results of the study imply links between public supervision and financial 
market development in a manner contradictory to most former research. Results 
suggest that certain features of public supervision correlate with financial market 
development.
6 Strong legal obligations for the supervisor to develop legislation 
correlate with higher company market values (better future prospects). Also, 
emphasizing economic theory derived values in the legislation correlate with 
higher market profitability. Furthermore, severe monetary sanctions applicable to 
company directors significantly (albeit negatively) correlate with market growth. 
Unexpectedly, the outcome is the same for a high degree of supervisory 
independence. 
  The paper starts with an overview of recent studies by the World Bank, La 
Porta et al as well as the IMF, addressing the relationship between public 
supervision and financial market development. In the following section, the focus 
is on the quantification of supervisory legislation, also covering a comparison of 
formulated legislative indexes with already established ones. Continuing with 
results and conclusions, attention is finally given the possible reasons why the 
                                                 
4 For an example of such debates see Spamann (2006) ‘On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity 
of La Porta et al's ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding’, revising ADRI results 
and intro-ducing general guidelines for more consistent legislative coding. 
5 In the study, financial market development is viewed in a manner building on Rajan and Zingales 
(2003). Accordingly, the aspects of financial market development focused on link to ‘the ease with 
which borrowers and savers are brought together, and the confidence that they have in each other’. 
From such a perspective, eg company market values may be seen to signal a certain degree of 
confidence, and hence are included in the notion of financial market development. 
6 The advantages of assessing legislation in relation to financial market development have also 
been acknowledged by eg Beck and Levine (2003): ‘An increasing number of legal scholars are 
emphasising the importance of differences in legal traditions and structures in the form of investor 
protection laws, contract enforcement, and property rights when assessing financial development’. 
A similar development has appeared in the area of corporate law, resulting in a striving towards 
understanding of legislative features of economic (and financial) relevance (Djankov et al, 2001, 
and Kraakman et al, 2004).  
9 




2  Previous empirical studies 
Recent empirical financial market studies assessing public supervision in relation 
to market development, comprise Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) ‘Bank 
Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?’ (BCL), and Barth, Nolle, 
Phumiswasana and Yago (2002) ‘A Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank 
Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance’ (BNPY), La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes and Shleifer (2006) ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’ (LLS), as well as 
Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004) ‘Does Regulatory Governance Matter for 
Financial System Stability? – an Empirical Analysis’ (DQC). 
  Starting with BCL, this study covers banking markets in some 107 countries, 
mainly for the year 1999, and assesses ‘the relationship between specific 
regulatory and supervisory practices and banking sector development, efficiency, 
and fragility’.
7 The study's focus is on available (formal) supervisory powers, 
rather than actual activity or actual routines. Instruments for directing market 
actor behavior (ie enforcement measures) as well as certain other supervisory 
characteristics are covered by the study, whilst supervisory input issues (such as 
means for information gathering) are analysed to a lesser extent. Supervisory 
objectives are seen as given (ie specified in the legislation), and hence 
automatically obeyed and fulfilled by the supervisor. In other words, the relation 
between legislation and authority action is viewed as coherent and 
nonproblematic.
8 
  The interest is both in private-sector monitoring (self-regulation) as well as in 
actual public enforcement measures signalling more severe interference in market 
conditions.
9 Moreover, the variety of legislative elements assessed by the BCL is 
not limited to rules regarding how the supervisor can/should act, but also includes 
traditional restrictions on market participant (bank) activities, ie restrictions on 
market entry, rules on capital adequacy and accounting and deposit insurance 
system design features. As for the rules regarding how the supervisor can/should 
act, these comprise rules on supervisory focus, powers, independence and 
                                                 
7 For a review of the regime data see www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank_regulation.htm. 
8 In practice, this is not always the case. Eg the regulatory environment into which public 
enforcement measures are introduced, may affect how keenly supervisors are able to address their 
tasks. Such knowledge interests (linking to a broader understanding of issues analyzed) have been 
emphasised by a number of leading economists (Pagano and Volpin ‘The Political Economy of 
Finance’ (2001), p. 517). 
9 For an extensive overview of the relation between public and private enforcement in the financial 
sector see Litan, Pomerleano and Sundararajan (eds) (2002).  
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resources. In practice, BCL outlines the supervisory concept as twofold, 
differentiating between supervisory measures, and resources. Supervisory 
measures are seen as a combination of certain official supervisory powers and the 
right to supervisory forbearance when confronted with violations. 
  Supervisory regimes are quantified using indexes that are based on yes/no 
questions, every yes-answer aggregating the index-value by one. The inclusion of 
legislative regime elements in the indexes mainly expresses the elements’ 
anticipated and independent causal contributions to selected endogenous variables 
(financial market development) rather than their function as parts of broader 
weighted aggregates. The relation between the legislative elements included is not 
the object of a separate analysis, though the questions underlying the indexes 
derive from the World Bank Guide. All regressions are carried out using larger 
index-entities. Financial market development is quantified by focusing on credit 
receivables (1997–1999), profitability figures (1997/1999) and the number of 
crises (late 1980s to 1999). No relationships between public enforcement and 
market outcomes are found. 
  Barth, Nolle, Phumiswasana and Yago (2002), BNPY, represents a similar 
evaluative and empirically-based approach to banking supervision. This study 
covers banking markets in some 55 countries with the ambition to analyse ‘the 
appropriate structure, scope and degree of independence of banking supervision’ 
in relation to bank profitability. The data covers the years 1996 to 1999.
10 
  In many senses, BNPY corresponds to BCL. Still, BNPY is more restricted to 
rules and principles directing supervisory activity, not banking legislation in a 
broader sense. The focus is on supervisory structure, scope, independence, 
sanctions and discretion. As for the appropriate structure, the question is whether 
there should be one or multiple supervisory authorities, and whether the central 
bank should be involved in banking supervision, and for the scope of supervision 
– whether bank supervisory authorities should supervise other financial services 
industries, including securities and insurance. The issue of independence relates to 
the degree to which banking supervisors are subject to political pressure and 
influence. 
  The availability of formal sanctions and possibility to apply supervisory 
discretion are quantified using a four-grade scale, without further information on 
the variables. Nor is the internal relation between the regime features included in 
the indexes, discussed. Regressions cover all index-subparts, additionally and 
independently. Market, ie profitability, data covers the whole period in question. 
                                                 
10 For a review of the regime data see www.worldbank.org/research/projects/bank_regulation.htm.  
11 
Similar to BCL, the study does not identify significant relationships between 
regime variables and bank profitability.
11 
  La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2006), LLS, deviates from the 
previous studies by ventilating securities market legislation and supervision, not 
banking markets. It narrowly focuses on one legal regime aspect, the regulation 
and supervision of initial public offerings (IPOs). Moreover, it links to public 
interest theory type of considerations on the overall need of public supervision 
and its relation to private enforcement. The study involves data from 49 
countries.
12 As for conclusions, no evidence is found that public supervision 
benefits stock markets, but strong evidence shows that laws facilitating private 
enforcement through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets. 
  The detailed features of the legal regimes covered (limited to the year 2000) 
comprise disclosure requirements, burden of proof in (issuers’) directors’ civil 
liability cases, certain characteristics of the securities market supervisor, 
investigative powers of the supervisor, as well as sanctions applicable, indicating 
that the emphasis in how enforcement is perceived is on the formal powers and 
not the supervisor’s actual actions. Focusing on supervisory characteristics, then, 
the appointment and dismissal of the supervisor’s board members, the width of 
supervisory responsibility, and regulatory independence, receives attention (index 
scale 0–1/2–1). Investigative powers relate to the right to demand documents and 
subpoena witnesses when investigating violations of securities laws. As for 
sanctions, the existence of administrative stop and do-orders applicable to issuers, 
those assisting in the arrangement of the IPOs, and accountants, as well as 
criminal sanctions against issuer directors, assisting parties and accountants, 
constitute regime aspects analysed (corresponding index scale). 
  In LLS, financial market development is addressed in a more diversified 
manner relative the other studies. External market capitalization/GDP, number of 
companies/million citizens, number of IPOs/GDP, control block premia, a 
qualitative access to equity measure, ownership concentration and value of stock 
traded, constitute market variables (covering mostly the years 1996–2000). 
Regressions allow for conclusions vis-à-vis each subpart of regime indexes and 
each market variable. Overall, the set up of the study signals a more balanced 
concept of public enforcement, indicating an interest in the internal relation 
between the regime variables investigated. Still, no positive relationships between 
                                                 
11 In the comparison of public enforcement with bank profitability, BNPY builds on the work of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999 and 2000). Bank profitability is measured as pre-tax profits 
divided by total assets and control variables include certain bank-level variables, macroeconomic 
variables, and other country-specific variables relating to financial structure, banking industry 
structure and deposit insurance. 
12 For a review of the data see //post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securities/ 
_data.xls.  
12 
public supervision (contrary to private enforcement) and financial market 
development are identified.
13 
  The last study to be assessed is Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004), DQC. 
Building on the work by Das and Quintyn (2002), this study focuses on the period 
from 1999 onwards, covering the countries included in the IMF country-specific 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). DQC first deals with supervision 
of the banking sector, but then extends its scope into other parts of financial 
markets. DQC only deals with public supervision.
14 
  Here, the regime features investigated are more general than in previous 
studies, constituting a Regulatory Governance Index (RGI) covering four 
supervisory qualities, ie supervisory independence, accountability, transparency 
and integrity. The emphasis is on de facto conditions (not only formal rules), 
increasing the empirical validity of the study. As for independence, the regulatory 
agency should be insulated from improper influence from the political sphere and 
from supervised entities.
15 Effective independence, however, cannot be achieved 
without accountability. Accountability is essential for the agency to justify its 
actions against the background of the mandate given to it. Transparency, in turn, 
refers to an environment in which the agency’s objectives, frameworks, decisions 
and their rationale, data and other information, as well as terms of accountability 
are provided to the public in a comprehensive, accessible, and timely manner. 
Finally, integrity refers to those mechanisms that ensure that agency staff can 
pursue institutional goals without compromising them due to their own behaviour, 
or self-interest.
16 
  RGI is related to the Financial System Soundness Index (FSSI). FSSI is 
composed of two quantitative variables, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and a 
ratio signalling the quality of the financial institution’s portfolio. Regression 
results indicate that regulatory governance has a significant influence on financial 
system soundness along with a number of other variables. 
                                                 
13 Of LLS financial market development variables, external market capitalisation is defined as the 
average ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders (as specified in La Porta et 
al, 1999). Control block premia is calculated taking the difference between the price per share paid 
for a control block and the exchange price (for a more detailed description see Dyck and Zingales, 
2004), whilst the qualitative access to equity measure is an index of the extent to which business 
executives find it easy to raise stock capital (Schwab et al, 1999). Ownership concentration 
corresponds to the degree of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the largest 
privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. 
14 DQC specify the finance sector environment, by distinguishing between the macroeconomic 
environment, the structure of the banking sector (ownership) and the institutional and governance 
environment. The institutional and governance environment cover more general variables 
compiled by the Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Freedom House, and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (2003). 
15 See Quintyn and Taylor (2003) for an analysis of the various types of supervisory independence 
acknowledged. 
16 For additional views on accountability see Hupkes et al (2004).  
13 
  Overall, DQC may be characterised by a network perception of the 
supervisory context, separating between three layers of governance, all 
constituting preconditions for a functioning supervisory context. The 
responsibilities (layers) in respect of good governance concern 1) the financial 
institutions themselves, bearing the ultimate responsibility for their own activities, 
2)  the regulatory agencies playing a key role in promoting and overseeing 
implementation of sound practices in the financial intermediaries, and generally 
3) the public sector as a whole striving towards sound standards in terms of ethics, 
integrity, competition etc. Hence, the perception of public supervision appeals to 
an analytical framework, which may be linked to financial market development 
through acceptable/reasonable hypotheses, increasing the empirical validity of the 
study and the possibility of identifying relationships. 
 
 
3  Quantifying public supervision 
In this empirical study, four areas of public supervision are investigated. The four 
areas of public supervision focused on in the study are listed below. The reason 
for concentrating on these specific areas is their experienced significance among 
supervisors when governing financial markets. The areas dealt with are: 
 
– legislatively  formulated  objectives for the supervisor, 
–  existing enforcement measures available to the supervisor, 
–  supervisory independence, as well as 
–  the width of the supervisor’s regulatory powers.
17 
 
All areas investigated deal with formal supervisory legislation rather than how 
supervision de facto is carried out. In other words, the focus is on how the 
legislator (ie society overall) perceives financial market rules. The presupposition 
is that in all (developed) countries, the supervisor will act accordingly. One could 
assume that a certain societal perception of how financial markets are regulated by 
law may causally direct, or at least in a correlational sense, interact with how 
financial markets actually develop. In the latter case, certain values characterising 
society on a general level, are both seen to direct how financial markets are 
                                                 
17 For an underlying theoretical concept regarding links between legislative environment types and 
economic conditions see Ogus (1994) ‘Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory’.  
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regulated through legislation and at the same time affect the way in which 
financial markets develop.
18 
  Since all areas investigated constitute fundamental parts of the supervisory 
regimes, conditions for the formulation of eventual hypotheses on the relation 
between public supervision and financial market development are good. Eg broad 
regulatory powers given to the supervisor may fairly be seen to affect financial 
market development by increasing the speed with which the supervisor may adapt 
to changing market conditions (eg in the case of new products) improving the 
operational environment for the supervised. In markets with narrow regulatory 
mandates, regulatory/legislative changes may require parliamentary approval, a 
procedure that may last several years.
19 
  Starting with legislatively formulated objectives for the supervisor in the US, 
UK, Swedish, Finnish, Polish and Estonian banking, investment firm, investment 
fund company and listed markets, the interest is first in the amount of normativity 
in the objectives formulated. The degree of normativity expresses how strongly 
the supervisor’s task of monitoring that supervised entities comply with the 
legislation shows in formulated objectives. The testable hypothesis formulated for 
this empirical study linking normativity (NORMAT) to financial market 
development is the following: 
 
–  A strong FSA focus on market participants obeying the rules, is an expression 
of an environment where the development of other supervisory areas (such as 
the abolition of externalities and other hinders for sectoral growth) are not 
considered central – implying negative correlation with market growth and 
positive correlation with market stability. 
 
The next area relating to how objectives for the supervisor are formulated 
concerns the level of dynamism identifiable in the objectives. The level of 
dynamism equals the question how strongly the law expressis verbis establishes 
obligations for the supervisor to promote that financial market rules correspond 
to changes in market conditions.
20 In turn, the testable hypothesis for this study 
linking dynamism (DYNAM) to financial market development is the following: 
                                                 
18 Though the idea of perceiving legislation as an attribute for general societal interests is widely 
accepted, it is also widely criticized. Citing Posner (1974) p. 350 ‘… Turning to the empirical 
evidence bearing on the economic theory of regulation, there are a fair number of case studies… 
supporting the view that economic regulation is better explained as a product supplied by interest 
groups than as an expression of (more general) social interests.’ 
19 Similar obligations given to the supervisor are eg found in the UK Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) that establishes as a duty for the Financial Services Authority to ‘have 
regard to… the desirability of facilitating innovation… and the international character of financial 
services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United 
Kingdom’. 
20 Eg in some countries the law may establish obligations for the supervisor to further develop 
existing market legislation in order to promote the introduction of new financial products.  
15 
 
–  Establishing obligations for the FSA to develop legislation and promote that 
rules correspond with changes in the environment signals a market culture 
facilitating innovation and sectoral growth – implying positive correlation 
with market valuations and growth. 
 
The last aspect linking to how supervisory objectives are formulated in the 
legislation concentrates on the overall level of economic theory values expressed 
in the formulations of supervisory objectives. The focus is on the extent to which 
ambitions towards market efficiency appear in the objectives. The testable 
hypothesis linking the level of economic theory values (ECON VAL) to financial 
market development is formulated as follows: 
 
–  Including values derived from economic theory in FSA task formulations is 
an attribute for a market environment concerned with efficiency, competition 
matters as well as conditions for market growth – implying positive 
correlation with market profitability and market growth.
21 
 
The legislatively formulated objectives for each market supervisor for the period 
from 1996 are analysed separately, but quantified and presented below on a yearly 
basis and on a cardinal (0–5) scale. – Starting with the level of normativity 
(NORMAT), this variable is, as mentioned, an indicator of how strongly the aim of 
securing that supervised entities comply with the law appears in the legislative 
formulations of FSA objectives and tasks. The measure is relative, weighing the 
amount of normative elements with the amount of other objectives and tasks 
established in the respective national laws concerning the supervisors’ activities. 
The picture below shows the overall trend of decreasing normativity in 
supervisory regimes analyzed. The establishment of the Commission for Banking 
Supervision in Poland in 1997, the merger of the Estonian supervisors in 2001, the 
new UK Financial Markets and Services Act in 2001 and the new Finnish 
                                                 
21 As for perceptions of public supervision in previous empirical research, BCL, focusing on the 
relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking sector 
development, efficiency and fragility, does not discuss the formulation of supervisory objectives in 
a principal, value-appealing manner. The approach is more concrete, concentrating on the eventual 
existence of multiple supervisors and their area of responsibility. – Continuing with BNPY, this 
study similarly views the question of supervisory tasks on a concrete level. In addition to the 
question on multiple supervisors, the involvement of the central bank in banking supervision and 
the scope of the banking supervisor vis-a-vis the securities and insurance market is covered. – The 
interest in the formulation of objectives is also limited in LLS’s treatment of IPOs, focusing on the 
scope of the supervisor as to the banking and securities markets. – Also, DQC does not deal 
directly with the issue of FSA objectives/tasks, but merely sees the issue as relating to 
transparency (for further details see appendix). – Neither BCL, BNPY nor LLS identifies any 
significant relationship between these aspects of public supervision and financial market 
conditions.  
16 
legislation regarding the FSA in 2003, all resulted in reforms decreasing the level 
of supervisory normativity. On the other hand, the degree of supervisory 
normativity as formulated in the legislation has not been touched upon in many 
financial markets during the period investigated. This is true for all US markets, 
Swedish markets and Polish capital markets.
22 
 
Figure 3.1  Normativity in formulated FSA objectives 
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Dynamism (DYNAM) in turn, deals with provisions obliging the FSA to develop 
legislation and promote that rules correspond to changes in the market 
environment. Also here, the existence of the tasks in question is registered on a 
cardinal (0–5) scale. Depending on the width of the FSA’s regulatory mandate, 
these provisions may direct the FSA to reform its own rules, alternatively provide 
the adequate regulator (eg the Ministry of Finance) with initiatives or create 
preconditions for regulatory co-operation. Contrary to the degree of normativity, 
the level of (legislative) dynamism, seems to have increased significantly in many 
of the countries investigated. US and Polish capital markets initially signal a high 
degree of dynamism, the case with the Swedish markets and US banking markets 
being the opposite. For all the other markets, the emphasis on adaptability as to 
changes in market conditions has clearly increased during the period. 
 
                                                 
22 Despite the cardinal scale applied for the figures, calculations are carried out using an ordinal 
approach, ie Spearman Ordinal Correlation Analysis, in order to guarantee a higher degree of 
empirical correspondance.  
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Figure 3.2  Dynamism in formulated FSA objectives 
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As for the level of economic theory values (ECON VAL) the approach is similar. 
Economic theory values deal with efficiency in the form of competition issues and 
the abolishment of adverse selection issues (informational aspects between the 
companies and their customers). The number of such aims in formulated FSA 
objectives and tasks (relative other markets) is registered on a corresponding 
scale. Similarly to normativity and dynamism, all changes in the level of 
economic theory values expressed during the years 1996–2005 in the markets 
investigated, are in one direction, implying an increase whenever reforms have 
been made. This is true for Estonian, UK, and Finnish banking, investment firm, 
investment fund and listed markets. Markets characterised by status quo (but high 




Figure 3.3  Economic theory values in formulated FSA 
      objectives (ECON VAL) 
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The following area to be analysed covers the characteristics of the supervisor’s 
enforcement arsenal. Contrary to the cases above, the relation between 
enforcement measures and financial market development has been addressed in 
several studies.
23 Hence, the quantification of enforcement measures has 
generated a number of indexations.
24 In this study, enforcement measures are 
further specified by focusing on the width of the measures available as well as the 
                                                 
23 Often, in financial market studies, public enforcement is perceived in a traditional and secure 
manner such as in Berger, Kyle and Scalise in Mishkin (ed.) (2001) where the view on public 
enforcement builds on the existing, widely acknowledged concept of the composite CAMELS-
rating system. 
24 In BCL, enforcement is quantified through the Official Supervisory Power Index (OSPI) based 
on certain World Bank Guide questions on the FSA’s relation to auditors, management and 
shareholders, the Prompt Corrective Power Index (PCPI) determining whether the law establishes 
conditions that force automatic actions, such as interventions, in the case of solvency deteoriation, 
while other indexes eg cover bank reorganisation and insolvency situations. The Supervisory 
Forbearance Discretion Index (SFDI) concentrates on the question of authorities engaging in 
forbearance when confronted with violations of laws and regulations or other imprudent 
behaviour. Areas concerned link to the position and obligations of auditors, management and 
shareholders. – In BNPY, public enforcement is narrowly defined as general banking sector 
forbearance discretion, on a 0–4 scale, whilst LLS enforcement separates between investigative 
powers, administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions. Investigative powers are quantified by the 
Investigative Powers Index (IPI) equalling the arithmetic mean of the Document Index (DI) and 
the Witness Index (WI). The DI quantifies the right of the FSA to command documents in specific 
cases whereas the WI deals with the right to subpoena the testimony of witnesses when 
investigating violations of securities laws. In the area of sanctions the approach is similarly 
bicentric. The starting point for the Orders Index (OI) is the applicability of enforcement powers in 
the form of stop and do-orders to issuers, distributors and accountants. The second index, the 
Criminal Index (CI) focuses on criminal sanctions applicable in cases when prospectuses omit 
material information. Potential addressees are directors and key officers of the issuer, the 
distributor or his/its officers, and the accountant or his/its officers (for details see appendix).  
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severity of existing means. Both these dimensions are covered by separate testable 
hypotheses: 
 
–  A high variety of FSA enforcement powers enables interference at an early 
stage when confronted with violations of existing rules by the supervised, and 
hence enhances the confidence in and stability of the markets – implying 
positive correlation with company market values and stability. 
– Severe  administrative  monetary  sanctions that may be imposed on 
companies/company directors for the violation of existing rules promote the 
confidence in and stability of the markets but may also restrict engagement in 
business activities – implying positive correlation with market values and 
stability and negative correlation with market growth. 
 
The width of enforcement measures (ENF WIDTH) takes account of the variety of 
legislative enforcement means provided by the respective supervisory regimes. 
Administrative monetary sanctions, prohibitions/injunctions, and publicity based 
informational sanctions constitute the arsenal here recognised. As for 
administrative monetary sanctions, conditional fines are also included in the data. 
The scope of application is considered, in that the imposition of a type of measure 
on company vs company individuals is viewed as two measures. The picture 
shows that in most countries/markets, the width of enforcement measures has 
increased significantly. Eg the introduction of the UK Financial Services and 
Markets Act in 2001 clearly boosted the enforcement arsenal applicable to UK 
banks. 
 
Figure 3.4  Width of FSA enforcement measures 



























Turning the attention towards the other previously discussed studies in order to 
assess ENF WIDTH, then BCL and LLS comprise elements of a corresponding 
character. The BCL Official Supervisory Power Index (OSPI), related graphically 
to ENF WIDTH below, constitute the sum of certain World Bank Guide questions 
on the FSA’s relation to bank auditors, management and shareholders, 
simultaneously considering the width of enforcement means. BCL data covers the 
period 1998–2001 and ENF WIDTH is diachronically matched in the comparison 
below. The picture expresses a high degree of resemblance between the OSPI, the 
coverage of which is analysed in more detail in appendix, and ENF WIDTH (B, 
banks). – LLS Orders Index (ORDI) in turn, focuses on administrative sanctions 
applicable to issuers, their distributors and accountants, does not include Poland 
or Estonia, and also signals a fair degree of congruence with ENF WIDTH. The 
period investigated covers the year 2000, and seems to take into account the new 
UK Financial Services and Markets Act. Hence, ENF WIDTH data is calibrated to 
match diachronically and in terms of markets (ie L, listed companies).
25 
 
Figure 3.5  Graphical comparison of enforcement indexes 















































In this study, the severity of monetary sanctions (SEV COMP/IND) is analysed as 
two separate variables, one for sanctions applicable to companies and the other for 
sanctions applicable to-company individuals. The focus is on the legislatively 
determined maximum size of administrative monetary sanctions, except for 
countries where such legislative limits are absent, and thus a rough estimate of the 
actual level of sanctions imposed is made. The special function of conditional 
fines (ie their conditionality) has resulted in them not being considered in the data. 
                                                 
25 The comparison signals a substantial amount of congruence despite the differences in calibration 
as to substance areas, indicating that internal relationships between legislative regime features 
exist.  
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Both pictures show a substantial variation and a mostly increasing overall trend in 
the markets analysed. 
 
Figure 3.6  Severity of monetary sanctions applicable 
      to companies (SEV COMP) 
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Figure 3.7  Severity of monetary sanctions applicable to 
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Comparing SEV COMP with existing indexes in order to validate it, some 
correspondence is also to this extent identifiable in relation to the established BCL 
OSPI and the LLS ORDI. In addition to OSPI and ORDI taking account of the 
width of enforcement means, the severity of means applicable to companies 
(though not restricted to monetary sanctions) partly appears in the OSPI and  
22 
ORDI perceptions of public enforcement as shown in appendix and the 
specification of the indexes at www.worldbank.org/research and 
post.economics.harvard.edu. The data is matched diachronically and regarding 
markets. 
 
Figure 3.8  Graphical comparison of enforcement indexes 





















































The following legislative features focused on comprise the degree of supervisory 
independence as well as the width of the supevisor’s regulatory mandate.
26 The 
inclusion of these aspects in the analysis is motivated by the following two 
testable hypotheses: 
 
–  Granting the FSA a high degree of independence vis-á-vis politics is a sign of 
a market environment concerned with the enhancement of market stability, 
confidence and development – implying positive correlation with market 
stability, company market values, market size and growth. 
–  An FSA possessing a wide regulatory mandate may speedily adjust to changes 
in the environment and emerging needs, expressing a supportive market 
culture as to innovation, market growth and market stability – implying 
positive correlation with market values, size, growth and stability. 
 
Supervisory independence (SUP INDEP), as here quantified, is defined as the 
distance between the FSA and politics. Such a perspective on independence may 
be characterised as institutional. The term politics covers both the governmental 
and parliamentary branches of government. Also, the focus is on the (formal) 
legislative structures, assuming that the differences as to actual practices are not 
considerable. Supervisory independence is quantified by focusing on its three 
                                                 
26 The supervisory literature reflects a keen interest in independence issues, eg Quintyn and Taylor 
(2003) identifies four dimensions of FSA independence, ie regulatory, supervisory, institutional 
and budgetary.  
23 
dimensions, the organisational allocation of the FSA (ie in terms of subordination 
and reporting), nomination of board members and head (localisation of 
appointment powers), and removal of board members and head (provisions on 
criteria). All dimensions have equal weight. According to the picture, both 
increases and decreases in supervisory independence are identifiable in many of 
the markets for the time-period investigated, exceptions comprising US and 
Swedish markets as well as Polish securities markets.
27 
 
Figure 3.9  Degree of FSA supervisory independence 
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Finally, the width of the supervisor’s regulatory mandate (REG MAND) is made 
operational according to similar standards. National regimes are classified into 
five categories. The categories identified comprise; ‘unlimited’ regulatory powers, 
general powers, specific but broad, specific and narrow, and no powers. Regimes 
represent a significant variation in this respect, both in terms of markets and over 
time. According to the picture, changes in both directions are identifiable, 
                                                 
27 BCL, BNPY and LLS focus on supervisory independence and LLS on the existence of rule-
making powers. BCL considers the issue of operational independence for the supervisor as one 
official supervisory resource variable. FSA operational independence is defined as independence 
from political influence. In BNPY, the view on independence is similar to the one of BCL. As for 
independence,  LLS concentrates on the appointment and dismissal of the majority of the 
supervisor’s board members (for further details see appendix).  
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implying that the allocation of regulative powers as to financial market activities 
continues to be a subject of debate.
28 
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Analysing BCL, BNPY and LLS views on supervisory independence, the 
specification of supervisory independence in this study (see above) corresponds to 
these views on independence. As mentioned, BCL and BNPY define 
independence in relation to potential political influence, ie primarily World Bank 
Guide questions on FSA accountability and appointment and removal of FSA 
head and board members. LLS only concentrates on the appointment and 
dismissal of board members. In the case of rule-making powers, LLS focuses on 
conditions for issuing IPO regulations. Below these indexations are compared 
graphically to INDEP and REG MAND, indicating some significant differences.
29 
 
                                                 
28  LLS acknowledges this regulatory issue under the Supervisor Characteristics Index (SCI), 
distinguishing between the situation where the supervisor generally can issue IPO regulations 
without approval of other agencies, with approval and not even with approval. As for rule-making 
powers, BCL and BNPY leave the width of the regulatory mandate untouched. DQC emphasizes 
the overall need of regulatory independence and a sufficiently broad mandate, as well as 
transparency as to regulatory policy and operations (for details see appendix). 
29 Though expressing a fair deal of congruence, the comparison shows significant differences in 
the view on supervisory independence in Estonian banking markets and on the width of the 
Swedish supervisor’s regulatory mandate – the reason for these differences being the deviations in 
the coverage and operational specifications of the notions.  
25 
Figure 3.11  Graphical comparison of supervisory 



















































4  Calculations and results 
As initially specified, the aim of the study is to analyse the relationship between 
the above listed eight legislative features of the supervisory regimes in the US, 
UK, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia and national financial market 
development. Financial market development is perceived as financial market 
growth, profitability (RoE), company market values (P/E) and risk 
(beta/volatility). The study covers the years 1996–2005. Financial markets 
investigated comprise banks, investment firms (ie brokers/dealers and investment 
management companies), investment fund companies (open-ended) and listed 
companies in each country. 
  The variables concretising financial market development have been included 
in the analysis as a result of their varying degree of sensitivity, assuming eg that 
differences in valuations may emerge more easily than differences in profitability, 
the latter in turn eventually preceding changes in market growth. The market data 
for the variables included is originally yearly. Some of the variables cover the 
markets as a whole, whilst other variables are sample-based.
30 
  Bank and investment firm market growth is perceived both as the change in 
the number of institutions and in the aggregate of balance sheet end sums, ie 
sectoral capitalization (OECD-, central bank-, regulator-, industry association 
data). For investment fund (companies) and listed markets, the corresponding 
measures are the number of funds/listed companies and their capitalization (ICI, 
World Federation of Exchanges). Samples (randomization in case of large sectors) 
                                                 
30 In all correlation-analyses, supervisory regime aspects and financial market development are 
quantified as period averages. The reason for this approach is the assumption that the relation 
between the supervisory regime aspects and financial market development is mostly value-
based/cultural. These values are not apt to change quickly. To the extent investigated, results are 
substantially coherent with an approach based on yearly observations.  
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are used in the determination of average levels of profitability (RoE), market 
values (P/E) and risk (beta/volatility). The judicial domicile of the parent/holding 
company is decisive as for the nationality of the groups, though some of them 
may have significant activities abroad. 
  In terms of samples, US markets are represented by 11 commercial banks, 25 
investment banks/brokerage firms/investment management companies, 9 
investment fund companies. UK markets include 10 commercial banks, 18 
investment firms, and 8 investment fund companies. Swedish markets comprise 6 
commercial banks, Finnish markets 4 commercial banks, Polish markets 5 
commercial banks and 6 investment banks/investment firms, and Estonian 
markets 2 commercial banks (Bloomberg sectoral data). The average RoE and P/E 
for the listed markets is based on Bloomberg data (SPX, ASX, SAX, HEX, WIG, 
TALSE). Stability figures for the listed markets are artificial beta-comparable 
attributes for diachronic volatility (Bloomberg). 
  Calculations are carried out using Spearman Ordinal Correlation Analysis. 
The motive for using an ordinal approach is the fact that preconditions for the 
comparison of supervisory regimes in a nominal sense are limited. Assessing if eg 
UK FSA regulatory powers are broader than corresponding Swedish ones, is more 
easily done than determining how much they diverge. Hence, the ordinal approach 
promotes the analysis’ empirical validity by allowing for any gradation. Below, 
the results of the correlation analysis are listed in matrix form. 
 
Table 4.1  Correlation matrix (sign. correlations underlined, 
      at least 5% insign. level) 
 










P/E -0,2627  0,4236  0,2405 -0,1104  0,2198 0,1904 0,0454  0,3576 
RoE 0,1855  0,1130  0,4737  0,3333 -0,0206 0,3751 0,1767  -0,1006 
Beta/Vol -0,3009  0,2833 0,2312  -0,1579 0,2629 0,1151 0,1930  0,3906 
N:o of 
instit.,  %  ch  0,1970  -0,2690 -0,1196 -0,3496 -0,3631 -0,5254 -0,5773  -0,3785 
Bal. sheet, 
% ch  0,0539  0,2377  -0,1886  0,0295  0,0909 -0,0506 -0,1159  -0,1477 
 
 
Overall, results imply four clearly significant relationships of a total of 40 
relationships. Three of four relationships support existing hypotheses. The 
significant relationships concern: 
 
–  FSA obligations to develop legislation and secure that the legislation 
corresponds to changing market conditions (DYNAM)/company market 
values (P/E), 
–  The level of economic theory values expressed in FSA objectives (ECON 
VAL)/market profitability (RoE),  
27 
–  The severity of sanctions applicable to company individuals (SEV 
IND)/market growth (% change in n:o), and 
–  The level of FSA independence (INDEP)/market growth (% change in n:o). 
 
A quick look on the other correlations and their signs, imply that market values 
and volatility may be lower in markets where the FSA’s mandate focuses on 
securing that companies obey the law. Also more generally, different and severe 
enforcement measures could link with limited increases in the number of market 
participants. Finally, wide FSA regulatory powers could link with higher company 
values and risk levels, as well as slower market growth.
31 
 Comparing  legislatively  formulated  FSA objectives with financial market 
development in accordance with the hypotheses listed above, results indicate that 
DYNAM is significantly and positively correlated with the way that markets 
value supervised entities (r=0,4236).
32 Results imply that in markets characterized 
by FSA rules emphasizing the need of developing legislation and promoting that 
legislation corresponds to changes in the environment, companies are more highly 
valued. Results do not illuminate the reasons for the correlation. In theory, there 
may be several reasons. The fact that obligations for the FSA to develop 
legislation and promote that rules correspond to changes in the environment 
correlate with company market values may be seen as an expression of a certain 
value athmosphere, affecting both how legislation is formulated and how markets 
develop. Another explanation could be purely causal, building on the fact that an 
active supervisor that considers changes in the environment, promotes the 
operational conditions for the supervised companies, thus improving their future 
prospects. 
  The following significant relationship identified is the one between ECON 
VAL and market profitability, indicating strong positive correlation (r=0,4737). 
Accordingly, there is evidence that the amount of economic theory derived values 
in FSA task formulations is linked with market sector RoEs. Economic theory 
values deal with market efficiency, both competition issues as well as adverse 
selection issues (informational aspects between the companies and their 
customers). Similarly to the relation between DYNAM and company market 
                                                 
31 A potential explanation for the link between FSA regulatory powers and market values could be 
that supervisors with ‘own’ rule-making powers are more dynamic, ie apt or expeditious in 
adapting to changes in the market environment, eg product innovations, implying better future 
prospects and higher market values for companies. In markets with narrow FSA regulatory 
mandates and national constitutions imposing requirements on regulation to be in the form of 
(parliamentary) legislation, the process of adapting to changes in the market environment may last 
several years. 
32 BCL, BNPY, LLS or DQC do not view market values as aspects of market development. Still, 
perceiving financial market development in a manner building on Rajan and Zingales (2003), 
higher market values may be seen as attributes for the mutual confidence between borrowers and 
savers.  
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values, the reasons behind the existing correlation may be of various types. An 
overall interest in economic aspects in society may eg show up in the legislation 
as well as in financial market figures. 
  As for enforcement measures relative to financial market development, one 
relationship turns out significant. This result clearly deviates from previous BCL, 
BNPY and LLS results. These previous studies did not find any relationships 
between public enforcement measures and financial market conditions.
33 The 
strongest relationship appears between the severity of monetary sanctions 
applicable to company individuals (SEV IND) and financial market growth (in the 
form of change in the number of institutions, r=-0,5254). The relationship being 
strongly significant and negative, implies that severe sanctions addressed to 
directors may restrict the appetite of establishing financial sector enterprises 
alternatively enhance incentives to close down existing ones. Relating SEV IND 
to financial market growth in the form of change in sector capitalization, this 
relationship turns out insignificant (albeit negative), indicating that sector capital 
is not affected to the same degree as the number of institutions. 
  The last of the clearly significant relationships is the one between INDEP and 
market growth (in the form of change in the number of institutions), signalling 
strong negative correlation (r=-0,5773). The outcome does not support the initial 





As for the empirical results of the study, the message is that certain legislative 
features governing the supervisor’s activities correlate with financial market 
development. FSA obligations to develop legislation and secure that the 
legislation corresponds with changing market conditions (DYNAM) significantly 
and positively correlate with company market values. The level of economic 
theory values expressed in FSA objectives (ECON VAL) similarly links to market 
profitability, whilst the severity of sanctions applicable to company directors 
(SEV IND) represent a negative relationship with market growth in terms of 
correlation. The latter is true also for FSA independence (INDEP). Of these four 
significant relationships, the first three support existing hypotheses. 
                                                 
33 As initially mentioned, only DQC regression results provide empirical evidence on the 
relationship be-tween accountability as an integral part of any enforcement activity (IMF Financial 
Sector Assessment Program Data) and indices of financial system soundness. 
34 Focusing on supervisory independence in BCL, BNPY and LLS, and on rule-making powers in 
LLS, no significant relationships as to financial market development are found. In DQC, there is 
correlation between the Regulatory Governance Index (RGI, which among other things includes 
supervisory independence), and the financial system stability index (FSSI).  
29 
  Though the study does not enlighten the reasons behind the correlations, the 
results may be interpreted as an indication that in legal evaluation studies 
methodology matters. By perceiving supervisory regime aspects as 
 
– values, 
– power-relations,  or 
– expressions  of  fundamental structural conditions, 
 
possibilities of finding relationships seem to improve. Hitherto, legal evaluation 
studies dealing with financial market issues have perceived legislation mostly in a 
technical manner, making the formulation of adequate, defendable hypotheses 
more difficult.
35 
  Perceiving legal provisions as attributes for certain values, legislative features 
may be indexed (ie picked or combined) in a way expressing the close link 
between the law and the values. In other words, any legislative features focused 
on should reflect the value in question. Also, values chosen should be significant, 
ie as to the relationship between the law and market conditions. Such values may 
eg comprise legislative a)  restrictivity-permissibility, b)  compulsiveness-
supportiveness, c)  statism-dynamism, d)  utlity orientation-risk aversiveness and 
e) directivity-adaptability.
36 
  Viewing supervision as a power relation, such an approach directs the focus 
towards the two categories of persons involved, ie the supervisor and the 
supervised and hence, the balance of power.
37 By looking at legal provisions as 
power issues, the possibilities of finding relationships as to market development 
increase fairly. Concentrating on public enforcement as a power-relation, the 
question arises as to how this relation could be perceived in a more detailed 
manner. Consequently, the relation between the parties could eg be viewed as 
a) the degree of power-balance biasedness, b) the overall number of enforcement 
and accountability measures, c)  the level of freedom in the application of 
supervisory measures (discretion/forbearance) as well as d) in respect of various 
types of enforcement/accountability means. 
  Finally, supervision may be viewed as an expression of fundamental structural 
conditions. Here, the question is not about values or power-relations, but merely 
about other fundamental societal features. These features may be more 
                                                 
35 For examples see Carlin and Mayer (2003) defining structural country variables, as well as 
Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2005), though the approach in this latter study may be motivated 
by the fact that the features recognised have received broader support in quality rankings. 
36 Though often difficult to identify in absolute terms, these values generally emerge as differences 
between judicial regimes, enabling at least ordinal comparison. 
37 The question regarding the power balance links to a broader concept. To what extent should the 
relation between the parties be balanced or would a strongly biased relationship be preferable eg 
from the perspective of market stability? What is the optimal power balance between the parties in 
terms of conditions for market growth?  
30 
concrete/immediate and easily identified in supervisory arrangements, or may be 
general (ie environmental), and have a broader impact on the shaping of 
supervision. Parts of the judicial culture, structural aspects of the market or 
behavioral patterns constitute examples of such general features. An Anglo-Saxon 
legal system could eg be seen to have certain implications on market actor 
practices and hence market development relative a continental European or 
Scandinavian system.
38 The same is true eg for the structure or the financing of 
supervision. 
                                                 
38 Eg Pistor (2000), analysing changes in the legal protection of shareholder and creditor rights, 
conclude that countries with German legal heritage favour creditor over shareholder protection and 
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